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Primer: International Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute Settlement
[Updated as of May 31, 2019]
What Are International Investment Agreements (IIAs)? IIAs are bilateral or multilateral
treaties that commit state-parties to afford specific standards of conduct to foreign investors from
the other state-parties. These treaties grant foreign investors certain benefits, including recourse
to Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) to resolve disputes with host states. Over 3,300
agreements have been concluded worldwide, including NAFTA and the Comprehensive and
Progressive TransPacific Partnership.
What is Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)? IIAs allow foreign investors (individuals
and companies) to allege treaty violations by suing states through ad hoc arbitration. Arbitration
tribunals are composed of party-appointed (and party-paid) private lawyers. Tribunals are not
bound by precedent, and can order remedies (usually in the form of monetary awards) to
investors if they find that states have breached treaty obligations. Notably, in most cases
investors are not required to attempt to resolve disputes through available domestic remedies
before filing ISDS claims. This is extraordinary and unusual: by contrast, the WTO only permits
states to raise claims against other states, and international human rights courts require claimants
to attempt to exhaust domestic remedies before raising disputes at the supranational level.
Why do countries sign IIAs? States often ground support for IIAs in their perceived ability to:
(1) promote investment flows, (2) depoliticize disputes between investors and states, (3) promote
the rule of law, and (4) provide compensation for various harms done to investors. However,
some state and other stakeholders have begun to question whether IIAs are in fact strategically
tailored to deliver on these objectives effectively and efficiently, and worry about the costs that
IIAs may impose on states and stakeholders within them. Empirical evidence is, for instance,
indeterminate as to whether IIAs actually stimulate new investments, let alone whether those
investments in fact benefit host (or home) countries, or whether the benefit of any new
investment outweighs the costs that may be associated with investment treaties (e.g., in the form
of lost regulatory space, costs of defending disputes, and costs of paying adverse awards).
What privileges do IIAs provide to investors? IIAs typically require states to provide foreign
investors certain standards of treatment. Provisions include:
● Requirements to compensate investors in the event of direct or indirect expropriations,1

1

Indirect expropriations are defined as one or a series of government measures that substantially deprive investors of
the value of their investments. Under international investment law, the aim or intent of the government measure (ie.,
whether it is taken in the public interest) is not a defense to liability. There are similar protections under the US
Constitution, but the doctrines are not coextensive, with decisions under US law generally more deferential to
government action than decisions of ISDS tribunals. See here, n 69 (and associated text).

1

● Protections against “unfair” or “inequitable” treatment by government actors, which have
been interpreted to cover investors’ “legitimate expectations” about future business
activities and government conduct, and
● Protections against “discrimination,” which have been interpreted to prevent disparate
treatment even in the absence of nationality-based discrimination.
How does ISDS affect states’ ability to govern? One way of thinking about the treaties is that
they provide internationally enforceable substantive protections for covered investors’ economic
rights and interests that are akin to the “Lochnerism” of the US Supreme Court until the 1930s.
This approach privileges the economic rights and interests of international investors/
multinational enterprises (MNEs) over competing economic and non-economic interests of other
entities and individuals. (Distinct from Lochnerism, however, where the US Supreme Court was
able to shift course, it is particularly difficult to cause course corrections in international
investment law when concerns arise that interpretations or applications of the law are
misguided). The deferential treatment afforded to economic interests increases the cost of
regulating, and as USTR recently acknowledged may even chill good faith action in the public
interest.
Cases have been brought against states to challenge myriad actions, including, among other
things:
● Efforts to combat tax evasion and money laundering;2
● Efforts to strengthen environmental laws or enforcement thereof;3
● Government regulation of the price and quality of essential public services such as
provision of water and energy;4
● Government regulation of health care products and services;5
● Government efforts to set intellectual property protections at a level that balances private
and public needs;6
● Government initiatives to try to mitigate the effects of historic discrimination;7and
● Government efforts to ensure foreign investment catalyzes domestic development.8
Federal Elektrik Yatirim v. Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/9; Quiborax v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/2, Award, 16 September 2015.
3
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, A
 ward, 8 June 2009; Lone Pine Resources v. Canada, I CSID Case No.
UNCT/15/2 (UNCITRAL); Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v. Germany,
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6.
4
United Utilities (Tallinn) B.V. and Aktsiaselts Tallinna Vesi v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/24; Suez,
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, Award, 9 April 2015; TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23,
Award, 19 December 2013, and Decision on Annulment, 5 April 2016.
5
Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-12 (UNCITRAL); HICEE B.V. v. The Slovak Republic,
PCA Case No. 2009-11 (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 17 October 2011; Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v.
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/12/1, Award, 25 August 2014.
6
Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2 (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 16 March 2017.
7
Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, 4 August 2010.
8
Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4.
2
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How are the rights of third-parties impacted by ISDS disputes? ISDS proceedings are
relatively opaque, secretive, and exclusive compared to the US and other domestic legal systems,
with the latter providing for transparency and mechanisms to take into account the rights and
interests of non-parties. Tribunals often have discretion to accept, or not, third-party amicus
briefs, which are frequently rejected even when the rights or interests of the non-parties/amici are
directly at stake in the ISDS claim. Unlike common legal protections that allow affected
non-parties to participate in cases (e.g. as impleaders or interpleaders), and/or require cases to be
dismissed if third-parties will be affected but cannot join the proceedings, affected third parties
in ISDS have no clear ability to effectively intervene in an ISDS proceeding, and there are no
rules ensuring that ISDS cases will be dismissed when they threaten third-parties’ rights.
Governments recently affirmed that international reform efforts should address concerns that the
rights or interests of third parties can be affected by ISDS disputes.
How many cases have there been? Through the end of 2018, at least 942 cases had been filed.9
There has been a rapid proliferation of these cases in recent years; while the first ISDS case was
initiated in 1987, over half of all cases to date were filed between 2012 and 2018.
Who usually brings ISDS cases? Who usually defends them? Successful claims are typically
brought by large multinational corporations: companies with over US$1 billion in annual
revenue and individuals worth more than US$100 million have received about 94.5% of the
aggregate ISDS-ordered financial transfers (93.5% if pre-award interest is included).10 The vast
majority of ISDS claims are brought against low- and middle-income states.11
Who decides cases? ISDS cases are typically decided by panels of three arbitrators, jointly
appointed and paid for by the investor and the respondent state (one arbitrator is selected by each
party and one selected jointly). Arbitrator selection is generally not subject to any qualification
requirement (e.g. areas of expertise), nor meaningful conflict of interest or impartiality
requirements. A small pool of arbitrators are appointed and reappointed in the vast majority of
cases. Some arbitrators also “double-hat,” representing claimants in ISDS disputes while also
sitting as arbitrators in other cases. This can and has led to scenarios in which attorneys have
used awards they have issued as “arbitrators” to support their legal positions when arguing as
counsel. (As noted below, the European Union is currently leading an effort to replace
party-appointed and party-paid arbitrators by a standing body or roster of adjudicators and is
9

However, not all cases or filings are public because rules requiring transparency are not consistently adopted or
applied. Disputing parties, and/or the arbitrators, could still decide to try to keep the arbitrations partially or totally
confidential, though in such cases, journalists and other may try to use Freedom of Information laws to try to access
the relevant information.
10
Gus Van Harten & Pavel Malysheuski, ‘Who has benefited financially from investment treaty arbitration? An
evaluation of the size and wealth of claimants’ (2016) Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper
Series 12(3), Research Paper No. 14, 1.
11
Daniel Behn and Ana Maria Daza, “The Defense Burden in International Investment Arbitration” (2019)
PluriCourts Working Paper (forthcoming).
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also working to prevent “double-hatting” in treaties currently under negotiation as well as
through the process at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law).
What do arbitrators consider in deciding cases? Arbitral tribunals look first and foremost at
the provisions of the relevant investment treaty in deciding cases. Whether or not a challenged
governmental action (or inaction) is consistent with domestic law (or even other areas of
international law (e.g. UNFCCC, human rights frameworks, etc.) is generally not considered to
be a defense to claims or liability under the IIA (but a breach of domestic law may be deemed to
violate the IIA). Conversely, because treaties almost universally place enforceable obligations
only on states, not investors, meaning that states can generally not initiate claims nor bring
counterclaims in ISDS, an investor may win a case even if it has violated domestic law or other
international human rights or environmental norms in relation to its operation of the investment.
To influence interpretation, the state defending itself, as well the other state party or parties to the
treaty (including the investor’s home state) can offer joint (and unilateral) interpretations to
clarify what treaty provisions mean. But what a defendant state says about the meaning of the
treaty is generally not binding (nor necessarily persuasive) for the tribunal interpreting the
agreement. Tribunals may draw from prior ISDS decisions but are not bound by precedent.
What happens when investors win cases? ISDS tribunals do not generally purport to overturn
or require reversal of state conduct; instead they typically award monetary damages to investors
(often in cases where monetary damages would not be the remedy under comparable domestic
law, where remand or other equitable remedies may apply). But the line between those categories
of relief has become increasingly blurred. Tribunals have, for instance, ordered injunctive relief
against states (e.g., telling the executive to halt tax collection efforts, cease criminal proceedings,
and preclude enforcement of domestic court judgments) and have then found states monetarily
liable for government decisions not to comply with those tribunal orders. Awards against states
regularly climb into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and have reached billions of dollars.12
The average claim against states (removing outliers) is at nearly US$300 million, and in cases
won by investors, the average award is just over US$120 million.13 Low and middle income
countries are often subject to awards that consume large portions of their annual budgets (i.e.,
resources that could otherwise be spent on health, education, and other national priorities).
Awards are highly enforceable and cannot be “appealed” as such, even if there was a mistake of
law or fact. If states don’t pay the awards, and the investors face trouble enforcing awards
through, e.g., seizure of government assets, investors may try to get their “home” states to place
diplomatic pressure on the host government.

12

Ibid.
Ibid. (including all claims analyzed, including outliers, the amount claimed would be US$ 1,476,000,000 and
amount awarded US$ 472,795,000).
13
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What are costs to states of defending against these claims? The average ISDS proceeding
costs $5 million per side in legal and tribunal fees.14 Complicated cases can cost more. For states
defending multiple claims in short order, these fees can add up -- consider Colombia, where 11
cases (and counting) have been filed since 2016.
Moreover, there is some evidence that the mere filing of an ISDS claim can inflict reputational
harm to host countries, reducing their attractiveness as destinations for foreign direct investment.
15

What is “Third-Party Funding” and why does it matter? Financial firms increasingly fund
and even recruit investors to bring ISDS cases, covering the claimants’ legal costs in exchange
for a stake in potential awards. This raises additional questions, including whether the
introduction of third-party funding leads to an increase in overall claims, an increase in frivolous
claims, alters win-loss ratios, impacts legal outcomes and overall development of the law, and
has broader effects on international flows of capital and taxation of that capital. Moreover, while
third-party funding in claims against governments is currently almost entirely unregulated in
investment arbitration, the US government, for example, with the US Anti-Assignment of Claims
Act,16 prohibits “a transfer or assignment of any part of a claim against the United States
Government or of an interest in a claim,” as well as “authorization to receive payment for any
part of the claim.” There are exceptions, such as permitting interest in claims to be transferred
after they have been determined to be valid and after the amount owed has been decided. The
Anti-Assignment aims to serve several policy objectives:
first, to prevent persons of influence from buying up claims which might then be
improperly urged upon Government officials; second, to prevent possible multiple
payment of claims and avoid the necessity of the investigation of alleged assignments by
permitting the Government to deal only with the original claimant; and third, to preserve
for the Government defenses and counterclaims which might not be available against an
assignee.17
Those policy objectives are not protected under the current laissez-faire approach to third-party
funding in ISDS.
What now? Approaches to reform:
14

Ibid; Matthew Hodgson, ‘Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Case for Reform’ in Jean E. Kalicki and
Anna Joubin-Bret (eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century
(Brill 2014) 756; Behn & Daza (n 10).
15
Todd Allee & Clint Peinhart, ‘Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign
Direct Investment’ (2011) 65 Int’l Organization 401 (calculating drops in FDI associated with even ultimately
unsuccessful claims); but see Andrew Kerner and Krzysztof Pelc, ‘Do Investor State Disputes Harm FDI?’ (2019)
Working paper, McGill University.
16
31 USC § 3727
17
Kingsbury v. United States [1977] 563 F.2d 1019, 1024.
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A number of states are considering various ISDS reforms and new IIA models, or even in some
new treaties. Importantly, UNCITRAL’s Working Group III -- the first major multilateral
negotiations on investment that have occurred since the OECD’s failed attempt in the mid-1990s
to establish a Multilateral Agreement on Investment -- is also considering the issue and
effectively decided in April 2019 that its efforts will include at least some further work on the
European Union’s proposed multilateral investment court. For the most part, however, all of
these efforts have focused on relatively small changes to ISDS and have not considered more
fundamental reforms to shift course on an IIA/ISDS system increasingly considered to be
ineffective, lack legitimacy, and have unintended and undesirable effects on other regulatory
prerogatives.
At CCSI, we contend that it is important to more broadly assess the costs and benefits of
investment treaties and ISDS, and rethink the role of international investment agreements as
tools for advancing sustainable development, from home and host country perspectives. This
means looking more closely at the objectives of these agreements, as well as alternative modes of
dispute settlement that might better serve identified objectives.
Even assuming that the multilateral court is a desirable way forward (which is a premise open to
question), it will likely take at least a decade to negotiate creation of such a court and actually
establish it. It is also unclear whether it will ever attract enough signatories, or the right
signatories, to make a difference for countries defending claims. In the interim, investors will
continue to bring, and states will continue to defend, claims in an ISDS system now widely
recognized as suffering from perceived and actual concerns going to its very legitimacy.
Therefore CCSI is exploring shorter-term ways for states to exit or mitigate the recognized
adverse effects of the more than 3,300 treaties that have been concluded to date. Chief among
these options, we’ve advocated for termination (or withdrawal of consent to ISDS arbitration) of
these treaties, as a near-term solution, alongside any longer-term project.
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